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Abstract:  
What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that 
this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? Here, I show how recent empirical 
evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the 
sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of 
bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, I discuss how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber 
Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia) and the multimodal 
nature of bodily self-knowledge challenge a classic view of ownership and immunity 
that puts bodily sensations at its core.  
 
Key words: Bodily sensations; body schema; body ownership; immunity to error; 
multimodality; Rubber Hand Illusion; self; somatoparaphrenia 
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The body has always elicited strong opinions, either pro (e.g., Spinoza, Nietzsche, 
Merleau-Ponty) or against (e.g., Plato, Descartes). Does the body imprison and 
deceive the soul, distracting it from the acquisition of knowledge? Or does it ground 
our existence? In more contemporary terms, could we be a disembodied brain in a vat 
or is embodiment constitutive of the faculties of the mind? Surprisingly, in most 
discussions, little time is spent in analysing what it is like to be embodied, and in 
particular in relation to self-awareness. Here, I shall describe various philosophical 
perspectives on the relation of the body and the self. I shall then focus on its 
psychological and epistemological aspects and raise two main questions. First, what 
grounds the sense of body ownership (i.e. experiencing one's body as one's own)? 
Second, what guarantees the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily 
self-ascriptions (i.e. no possible rational doubt that one's body is one's own)? A 
traditional method in philosophy consists in appealing to thought experiments to solve 
this type of questions, but I shall show how recent scientific experiments can 
challenge our classic assumptions on the role of bodily sensations for the sense of 
body ownership and for bodily immunity. 
 
1. The body and the self: A panorama 
In the short story The Notary's nose, Edmond About (1862) described the tribulations 
of a notary who gets his nose cut off and who buys a new nose from a poor water-
carrier and successfully grafts a bit of his arm skin. Yet, the new nose behaves as if it 
were still a part of the donor's body. When the water-carrier drinks too much, the 
notary's nose is red; when he starves, it dwindles away; when he loses his arm from 
which the graft was made, the nose drops off altogether. This tale from the nineteen 
century highlights a number of major questions about the relation of the body and the 
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self that are still open nowadays. What makes a nose one's own? Can one sell or buy a 
nose? Is the nose constitutive of a person? What grounds the notary's experience of 
the new nose as his own? And can he doubt that it is his own nose? Those questions 
are only a few examples of a wide range of issues about the body and the self from 
ontological, moral, psychological and epistemological perspectives that I shall quickly 
overview with the help of a few key questions each time. 
1.1 Ontological issues 
Is the self to the body merely what a captain is to his ship? Or is it more, and if so, 
what? The Cartesian view assumes that the self is purely mental. The captain may as 
well command another ship for all that matters. However, one may argue that the 
body grounds the self, or that it anchors and individuates the self through time, thus 
guaranteeing personal identity. One may even go a step further and posit a relation of 
identity between the body and the self. Those questions aims at determining what the 
body is for the self. Alternatively, one may ask which body has this specific relation 
to the self. In other words, we talk of our own body, but how to individuate it? As we 
shall see later, it has been proposed that one's own body is the body where one feels 
sensations, but one may as well claim that it is the body we care for and/or the body 
we directly control.  
Sample of ontological questions: 
- Am I a body or do I own a body? 
- Is the self bodily?  
- What role does the body play for personal identity?  
- Which body is mine?  
 
1.2 Ethical and legal issues 
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Biomedical research is booming. Crucial to all of this is the ability to obtain, store and 
use parts of the human body taken from living individuals. These developments raise 
major issues concerning the moral and legal status of what one may call human 
biological materials. The general context of analysis is that the human body cannot be 
treated as a simple object upon which one has property rights, let alone as a mere 
instrument. Though everyone agrees on the complexity of the moral and legal status 
of the body, the views vary. In the line of the Habeas Corpus Act (1675), the subject 
has full authority and unrestricted property rights over her body. Alternatively, in the 
line of the Roman law and the model of the Divine Right of Kings, the State owns the 
body and decides its fate in order to protect the society and the citizens, whereas the 
subject is the mere 'usufruct' of her body.  
Sample of ethical and legal questions: 
- Can the body be owned? Can one have property rights upon human body 
parts? 
- If so, who owns the human body?  
- Does the moral and legal status of the body vary whether it is the living body 
or the body after death, or whether it refers to separated tissues or human 
fluids (e.g., semen, saliva, blood)? 
- Can the body be commercialized like any object? 
 
1.3 Psychological issues  
Our biological body directly strikes us as belonging to us. We are aware of our 
biological body as our own. But do we merely believe it or do we feel it? According 
to the deflationary conception of the sense of body ownership, there may be only 
judgements of ownership, with no corresponding feeling of ownership. On the 
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contrary, according to the inflationary conception, there is something it is like to 
experience our body as our own that goes beyond the mere experience of bodily 
properties. Our body is manifested to us in a more primitive form that beliefs or 
judgments, in the form of an immediate or pre-reflective awareness of body 
ownership. But if there is such feeling of body ownership, what grounds it?  
Sample of psychological questions: 
- Is there a positive phenomenology of 'myness'?  
- Is the sense of ownership similar for internal organs, face and limbs? 
- What is the functional role of the sense of ownership?  
- How is the sense of ownership related to (a) bodily sensations, (b) action, and 
(c) emotion? 
- Can one feel body ownership towards any object besides one's biological 
body, no matter its shape and its location? 
- Can one feel disownership towards one's biological body? And if so, is the 
sense of disownership the mere result of the lack of sense of ownership? 
 
1.4 Epistemological issues 
The self-ascription of a property is said to be immune to error through 
misidentification relative to the first-person (hereafter IEM) if one cannot be mistaken 
about the person who instantiates the property, namely oneself, when one has gained 
information about the property in the appropriate way. For instance, if I think that I 
am anxious because I feel anxious, my thought is IEM because introspection gives a 
privileged inner access to my own mental life that I do not have for other people's 
mental life. But if I think that I am anxious because my psychoanalyst told me so, my 
thought is not IEM. Indeed, the psychoanalyst may have confused me with another 
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patient, who is the person suffering from anxiety. One can be mistaken about the 
psychological property one ascribes to oneself, but one cannot be mistaken about the 
person who instantiates the psychological property. Most accounts of immunity to 
error through misidentification have focused on self-ascriptions of mental states 
(Shoemaker 1968; Wright 1998; McGinn 1983; Peacocke 1999; Pryor 1999). But is 
immunity an epistemic property restricted to a certain class of psychological self-
ascriptions or does it apply as well to self-ascriptions of bodily properties? By bodily 
self-ascriptions, I do not mean the ascription of bodily sensations. Bodily sensations 
are mental states, like emotions, beliefs or desires. By bodily ascription, I mean the 
ascription of bodily properties (e.g. body size, weight, posture, etc.). 
Sample of epistemological questions: 
-­‐ Are bodily self-ascriptions IEM?  -­‐ What are the appropriate grounds that can secure bodily immunity? -­‐ Do self-ascriptions of bodily properties display the same type of immunity as 
self-ascriptions of mental states?  -­‐ Does bodily immunity reveal the bodily nature of the self? 
 
To conclude, questions about the body and the self have long been considered to be 
beyond reach of experimental studies. This is true of some of them, but these last ten 
years, research in cognitive science has yielded a vast array of exciting discoveries 
and provocative hypotheses about bodily awareness and self-awareness. Here, I shall 
illustrate how the dialog between philosophy and cognitive science can be fruitful, 
and thus for both domains. On the one hand, confrontation with empirical findings 
sheds new light on long-standing conceptual issues about the body and the self, helps 
philosophers to forge and sharpen new conceptual frameworks for the investigation of 
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bodily self-awareness, and raises new philosophical puzzles. However, empirical 
results provide only partial or indirect replies to questions raised in philosophy. 
Philosophical theories and conceptual tools are thus needed for the perspicuous 
interpretation of empirical data and their systematization. 
 
2. Bodily sensations and bodily ownership  
One strategy to answer some of the questions outlined above is to compare 
experiences of one's own body and experiences of other people's bodies. The 
underlying assumption is that what is specific to the experiences of one's own body -  
whether it is the specific way one perceives it, one affectively reacts to what happens 
to it, or one controls it - may indicate which body is one's own and which body one 
experiences as one's own. Here, I shall limit myself to analyse the different types of 
perceptual experiences of one's body and of other bodies.  
We have a privileged internal access to our own body that we do not have for other 
bodies. Unlike other physical objects, our body is experienced not only from the 
outside (e.g., vision), but also from the inside (e.g., bodily sensations). We do not feel 
bodily sensations in other bodies than our own, whereas we see many bodies. A 
traditional conception of bodily ownership thus relates bodily sensations and body 
ownership at various levels: 
(a) At the ontological level of body ownership (e.g., Locke 1689): One's own 
body consists in the body in which one feels sensations. 
(b) At the psychological level of the sense of body ownership (e.g., Brewer 
1995; Cassam 1997; Dokic 2003; Martin 1995; Bermudez 1998): The body 
that one experiences as one's own is the body that one experiences from the 
inside. 
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(c) At the level of the epistemic properties of judgments of body ownership 
(e.g., Evans 1982, Brewer 1995; Cassam 1997; Bermudez 1998): Bodily 
self-ascriptions are IEM if they are grounded in bodily experiences.  
Here, I shall leave aside the ontological view to focus on the others. On the 
psychological view, the sense of body ownership is grounded in bodily experiences 
such as the sense of pressure, the sense of posture and the sense of balance (i.e. body 
senses). There are two ways to interpret this theory. According to the informational 
account, bodily experiences ground the sense of ownership because the body senses 
are characterized by a privileged informational/causal link to one's body, and to no 
other bodies. For example, I cannot have access to the posture of another body 
through proprioception. The body that one experiences as one's own is the body from 
which one receives internal information (e.g. through proprioception). Alternatively, 
according to the spatial account, what grounds the sense of ownership is not the fact 
that one has access to the bodily property from the inside, but that one localizes the 
bodily property within the spatial representation of one's own body. When I feel a 
bodily sensation, I do not feel it in one body as opposed to another body. I feel it in 
my own body. The body that one experiences as one's own is the body in which one 
spatially ascribes sensations.i On both accounts, vision is disqualified as a possible 
ground of the sense of ownership. As Brewer (1995) says, the visual body, that is, the 
body from the outside, does not bear the "stamp of ownership". On the one hand, 
vision carries information about more than one's own body. On the other hand, the 
property can be localized outside the representation of the boundaries of one's body. 
When one sees a red spot on one's hand, one sees it on one hand as opposed to many 
other hands.  
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The dichotomy between two types of perceptual experiences, either from the inside 
or from the outside, is also at the core of the epistemological view, which claims that 
the two types of perceptual experiences lead to two classes of bodily judgments with 
distinct epistemic properties. In particular, bodily self-ascriptions based on bodily 
experiences are said to be IEM because bodily experiences give a privileged inner 
access to one's bodily states. For instance, on the basis of proprioception, I may be 
mistaken about my bodily posture (e.g., my legs are not crossed), but I cannot 
rationnaly doubt that those are my legs that I feel crossed. Proprioceptive experiences 
suffice to justify bodily self-ascriptions such that no intermediary process of self-
identification is required. The judgment “my legs are crossed” is not grounded in the 
judgment “those legs are crossed” and in the identification “those legs are mine”. By 
contrast, as noted by Wittgenstein (1958), I can see an arm broken, but this does not 
entitle me to directly conclude that my own arm is broken. It might be another 
person’s arm that is intermingled with mine. I may be mistaken about whose arm is 
broken because I can see my arm, as well as many other arms. There is a gap between 
visually knowing that a body is F and visually knowing that it is my own body that is 
F, a gap that needs to be fulfilled with the help of self-identification.  
To conclude, there seems to be a dichotomy between two well-defined types of 
perceptual experiences of one's body, from the inside and from the outside, with 
distinct psychological properties (stamp of ownership or not) and distinct epistemic 
properties (bodily immunity or not). I shall now refine this view in the light of 
empirical phenomena. In section 3, I shall show how the analysis of some disorders 
and illusions of bodily self-awareness contributes in our understanding of the relation 
between bodily experiences and the sense of body ownership. In section 4, I shall 
revise the dichotomy between the perception of the body from the inside and from the 
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outside in the light of pervasive multimodal effects, and assess their consequences for 
bodily immunity. I shall not go into the details each time,ii but rather sketch how 
cognitive science can improve our understanding of the sense of body ownership and 
bodily immunity.  
 
3. The grounds of the sense of ownership 
3.1 This is my hand 
Can one experience ownership towards an object extraneous to one's biological 
body? The reply is yes, as shown by a bodily illusion recently discovered, the Rubber 
Hand Illusion (hereafter, RHI). The RHI has become the main experimental design to 
artificially manipulate the sense of body ownership in healthy individuals. 
Participants sit with their arm resting on a table, hidden behind a screen, while 
looking at a fake hand presented in front of them. An experimenter then 
simultaneously strokes with two paintbrushes both the participants' biological hand 
and the fake hand. The illusion is fourfold: (i) participants feel as if they were touched 
on the rubber hand; (ii) they feel as if the rubber hand were their own hand; (iii) they 
mislocalize their hand in the direction of the rubber hand (i.e. proprioceptive drift); 
(iv) they emotionally react when the rubber hand is threatened or hurt as if it were 
their own hand that was in danger. Although there are some disagreements about the 
correct interpretation of the RHI, one may conclude that one can experience an object 
as one's own despite the fact that is not spatially connected with one's biological body 
and that one knows that it is a mere rubber hand:  
 “I found myself looking at the dummy hand thinking it was actually my 
own.” In Botvinick and Cohen (1998, 756) 
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Hence, it seems that an object that is only seen can bear the stamp of ownership. 
This result questions the relation between bodily sensations and the sense of 
ownership. More particularly, I shall argue that the RHI refutes the informational 
account of ownership, but not the spatial account. One can indeed explain the sense of 
ownership of the rubber hand in terms of the spatial content that assigns a specific 
location to the bodily property within a representation of the space of one's body.  
In the RHI, participants do not receive tactile information from the rubber hand 
(i.e. they do not have tactile receptors on the rubber hand that convey tactile signals to 
the brain), but from their biological hand that is touched in synchrony. Hence, it is not 
necessary to receive information from the inside (e.g. through the sense of pressure) 
to experience a body part as one's own. Yet, we are not entitled to conclude on the 
sole basis of these results that the sense of ownership is completely independent of 
bodily experiences and that it is grounded in a further mechanism, still to be 
determined. What is interesting in the RHI is that the participants assign the sensation 
of pressure to the rubber hand, and not the biological hand. The sense of ownership of 
the rubber hand is thus compatible with the spatial account. If the sense of body 
ownership is indeed grounded in the spatial ascription of bodily experiences, it is then 
of no surprise that participants experience the rubber hand as their own. Nonetheless, 
the RHI brings a new insight on the spatial account of the sense of ownership. In 
particular, it reveals that pressure is localized within a spatial representation of the 
body that is based not only on touch, but also on vision. One needs thus to refine the 
spatial account of the sense of ownership to take into account the multimodality of the 
representation of the body space. I shall come back later to it. 
 
3.2 This is not my hand 
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Not only can we experience as our own an extraneous object, but we can also 
experience our own body as alien. Although the sense of body ownership may appear 
as a given, various psychiatric or neurological conditions indeed highlight the 
possibility of losing the sense of ownership of one’s body. For example, patients 
suffering from the psychiatric disorder of depersonalization experience a general 
alteration of their relation to the self, as revealed by anomalous bodily experiences, 
emotional numbing, sensation of alienation from surroundings and anomalous 
subjective recall (Sierra et al. 2005).  
 “I don’t know who I am, of course I am **** but I feel like a robot, like I 
am listening to someone else talking, like I am looking at myself from the 
outside, but it is not another voice or body, it is mine, it is me, it just 
doesn’t feel like it.” In Baker et al. (2003, 432)  
In particular, patients often feel as if their body did not belong to them or as if it 
had disappeared, leading them to compulsively touch their body and pour hot water 
on it to reassure themselves of their bodily existence. Similarly, following brain lesion 
or epileptic seizure, patients with somatoparaphrenia (also sometimes called 
asomatognosia or alien hand sign) deny ownership of one of their limbs so that they 
can even attribute it to another individual (Vallar and Ronchi 2009).  
 “Examiner: Whose arm is this? AR: It’s not mine. Ex: Whose is it? AR: 
It’s my mother’s. Ex: How on earth does it happen to be there? AR: I don’t 
know. I found it in my bed. Ex: How long has it been there? AR: Since the 
first day. Feel, it’s warmer than mine. The other day too, when the weather 
was colder, it was warmer than mine. Ex: So, where is your left arm? AR: 
It’s under there (indefinite gesture forwards) (…) Look, it’s queer, but 
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that’s how it is. Just fancy finding your son’s arm in your bed” In Bisiach 
et al. (1991, 1030) 
Whereas patients with depersonalization are aware that their bodily alienation is 
just an illusion, patients with somatoparaphrenia are convinced that the limb does not 
belong to them and they maintain their delusional belief despite correction: “Feinberg: 
Suppose I told you this was your hand? Mirna: I wouldn’t believe you." (Feinberg et 
al. 2005, 104). However, it is with Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) that the 
experience of disownership leads to the most extreme and tragic consequences. 
Patients with BIID feel the overwhelming desire to be amputated of one(s) of their 
perfectly healthy limbs, partly because they experience this limb as alien (First 2005; 
Bayne and Levy 2005; Brang et al. 2008). Some actually perform self-amputation, 
going as far as lying under a train, building a homemade guillotine, or freezing their 
legs in dry ice. 
 “I don't understand where it comes from or what it is. I just don't want 
legs. Inside I feel that my legs don't belong to me, they shouldn't be there. 
At best my legs seem extraneous. I would almost say as if they're not part 
of me although I feel them, I see them, I know they are...” Corrine (in 
“Complete Obsession,” BBC, 17th February, 2000) 
To conclude, although counterintuitive, one can feel disownership towards one's 
biological body. But it may not be so surprising. Anybody can indeed sometimes 
wake up during the night with a 'sleeping' arm that almost feels alien. The lack of 
bodily sensations in the arm accounts for the lack of ownership feelings. This 
explanation reveals the importance of bodily experiences for the sense of ownership, 
and one may generalize it to the listed disownership syndromes: patients would not 
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experience their hand as their own because they would no longer receive information 
about their 'alien' hand from the inside.iii  
However, the reality is more complex. On the one hand, the deprivation of bodily 
sensations does not always lead to the lack of ownership feeling. In a study with 
normal subjects who have been locally anaesthetized, only 5 out of 36 subjects denied 
the ownership of their limb (Paqueron et al. 2003). On the other hand, disownership 
feelings are not always associated with the lack of bodily experiences. The patients 
described above are not always numb or anaesthetized in their ‘alien’ limb. For 
example, when somatoparaphrenic patients are touched with a paintbrush or 
pinpricked, they can feel the touch or the pinprick (Melzack 1990; Moro et al. 2004; 
Bottini, et al. 2002). Yet, they fail to experience the hand that they feel being touched 
as their own. In other words, the body that we feel may always be our own in our 
actual world, but it does not follow that we always experience it as our own. 
In a nutshell, patients have access from the inside to the properties of their 'alien' 
body part, and yet, this does not suffice to elicit ownership feelings. The 
informational account of the sense of ownership is invalidated. But do disownership 
syndromes refute as well the spatial account? At first sight, it may seem so. Indeed, 
the patients localize the touch on their 'alien' hand. Hence, the spatial representation 
of their body still includes the 'alien' hand, and yet their hand feels alien. It is not as if 
they reported that they felt the touch, but they did not know where. However, 
disownership syndromes may not be a fatal objection against the spatial account if 
there are several types of body representation, and only one of them grounds the sense 
of ownership. I shall briefly develop this argument here. 
Arguably, one single type of body representation cannot suffice to account for the 
diversity of bodily aspects (e.g. semantic, emotional, spatial, motor, tactile, visual, 
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proprioceptive, etc.) and the variety of bodily disorders (e.g. autotopagnosia, phantom 
limb, somatoparaphrenia, anorexia nervosa, body-specific aphasia, personal neglect, 
etc). In particular, one may distinguish between the representation of bodily 
information exploited for action (i.e. body schema) and the representation of bodily 
information used by perception (i.e. body image) (Paillard 1999; Gallagher 2005; de 
Vignemont 2010a). If there are several types of body representations, then the 'alien' 
hand can be represented at one level, but not at another. Furthermore, one may 
suggest that it is the impaired body representation that is responsible for the lack of 
ownership. A careful study of somatoparaphrenia can thus help us to determine which 
body representation is disrupted, and eventually which body representation grounds 
the sense of ownership.  
I shall not go into the detail here, but some evidence points towards a disruption 
of the body schema in somatoparaphrenia. Interestingly, most somatoparaphrenic 
patients are either paralyzed or suffer from the anarchic hand syndrome (they cannot 
control their ‘alien’ hand). For example, a patient during epileptic seizure felt his leg 
as alien and immediately fell. One possible interpretation is that his leg was no longer 
represented within his body schema, which led the patient both to fall and to feel that 
the leg did not belong to him (Elson and Schaüble 2004). I propose that the 
sensorimotor body representation that carries information about the long-term 
properties of one's own body necessary for action is at the source of the sense of 
ownership. Roughly speaking, the body that you represent for acting is the body that 
you experience as your own. In somatoparaphrenia, the 'alien' limb is no longer 
represented within this sensorimotor representation of the body space, preventing thus 
the touch to be localized on the hand at the sensorimotor level, and the hand to feel as 
one's own. Hence, one can account for the lack of sense of ownership of one's hand in 
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terms of the spatial ascription that assigns a specific location to the bodily property 
within a sensorimotor representation of the space of one's body. 
To conclude, the analysis of illusory and disrupted ownership experiences has 
deepened our understanding of the relation between bodily experiences and the sense 
of ownership. In a nutshell, the sense of body ownership can be at odds with the body 
that one experiences from the inside. I have shown that the Rubber Hand Illusion and 
somatoparaphrenia argue against the informational account of the sense of ownership. 
Yet, they can fit within the framework of the spatial account. Nonetheless, further 
arguments and details need to be provided if one wants to make a case for the spatial 
account of the sense of ownership. One needs to develop a theory of the spatial 
ascription of bodily experiences, which takes into account the role of vision and 
action in shaping the representation of the bodily space. It is only if one takes into 
account the recent empirical literature on body representations that one can offer a 
full-fleshed theory of bodily space and the sense of body ownership.  
 
4. The grounds of bodily immunity 
I shall approach now the link between bodily experiences and ownership at the 
epistemological level and analyse the various ways empirical phenomena could enrich 
our understanding of immunity to error through misidentification before focusing on 
the issue of multimodal bodily self-knowledge.  
First, in order to question the hypothesis of immunity to error, one may look at 
recent technological developments and prospects that challenge the very idea that one 
is connected only to one's biological body. Patients that are fully paralysed can play 
ping-pong on a computer screen. Artists like Stellarc can incorporate a prosthetic third 
arm that moves at will. What used to be mere thought experiments may become soon 
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reality. The anatomical constraints that secure the causal chain between bodily 
experiences and one's body might be override in the future if, for instance, one’s brain 
is connected to another individual’s body. One would then directly experience from 
the inside another’s bodily states and postures. If so, knowing that the arms are 
crossed via proprioception would no longer guarantee that those are one’s arms that 
are crossed. In this futuristic scenario, bodily self-ascriptions grounded in bodily 
experiences are not IEM. 
A second way to empirically address the issue of bodily immunity is to look for 
bodily misidentification in judgments that are grounded in bodily experiences. If such 
cases exist, then bodily self-ascriptions are not IEM. One may suggest for instance 
that the RHI and somatoparaphrenia constitute such cases (e.g., Mizumoto and 
Ishikawa 2005). In both cases, one misidentifies whose hand it is, whether one self-
attributes an external hand or attributes one’s own hand to another individual. 
However, not any case of misidentification can falsify the hypothesis of immunity to 
error, and in particular nor the RHI nor somatoparaphrenia can challenge the fact that 
bodily experiences guarantee bodily immunity. The hypothesis of bodily immunity 
claims that if the ownership judgment derives from the appropriate way of gaining 
information about the bodily property, namely, the senses of posture, balance and 
pressure, then it is IEM. But the way of gaining bodily knowledge is not appropriate 
in the RHI. Indeed, it is vision that gives the information that the bodily property is 
instantiated, not proprioception or touch. That is why the RHI is characterized in 
terms of visual capture of touch and proprioception. And in this case, vision does not 
guarantee bodily immunity. As for somatoparaphrenia, the patients have the 
appropriate grounds that guarantee the immunity of bodily self-ascriptions (e.g., they 
have tactile experiences), if self-ascriptions were to be made. But the mere presence 
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of appropriate grounds does not suffice to guarantee that one does make those self-
ascriptions. Roughly, it is not because one has plenty of good reasons to believe that p 
that one believes that p. And it is not because one does not believe that p that one does 
not have the good reasons for believing that p. Hence, the patients may have the 
appropriate grounds to make the judgment that this is one’s own hand, but that does 
not necessarily imply that one makes such judgment. And the fact that they do not 
make the ownership judgment does not challenge the validity of the grounds. The 
patients may indeed have other reasons that they take to defeat their grounds. Hence, 
somatoparaphrenia and the RHI have no relevance for bodily immunity.   
Finally, the maybe most interesting and promising way to empirically address 
bodily immunity is to focus on the grounds of bodily self-knowledge. One important 
move in the discussion of immunity to error has been to acknowledge that immunity 
does not apply to propositions per se, but to thoughts made upon specific grounds. In 
principle, any self-ascription can be IEM if the subject has gained information about 
the property in the appropriate way. This allows not only psychological self-
ascriptions, but also bodily self-ascriptions to be IEM. But what are the appropriate 
grounds that secure bodily immunity? It is generally asummed that the body senses 
(e.g., touch, proprioception and the sense of balance) guarantee bodily immunity. 
However, recent empirical findings have shown that the normal way of gaining bodily 
self-knowledge is not via the body senses per se, but rather via the integration of body 
senses with vision. Bodily self-knowledge is primarily multimodal. But if bodily self-
ascriptions are grounded not only in proprioception, which secures bodily immunity, 
but also in vision, which is not supposed to secure bodily immunity, then are bodily 
self-ascriptions still IEM? 
To appear in Metaphilosophy 
	   20	  
For a long time, most research on perception has studied each sensory modality in 
isolation. However, not only do we experience the world through various senses at the 
same time, but those senses also interact together. Then information from one 
modality impact another such that it reorganizes its perceptual experience. Plurimodal 
integration can imply the resolution of conflicts between the different kinds of 
information, and it can even sometimes lead to perceptual illusions. For example, in 
the ventriloquism effect, the absence of seen lip-movement alters the apparent 
location of speech sounds. Cross-modal effects can be found between all modalities. 
In particular, vision, proprioception and touch can mutually interfere. For the sake of 
this paper, I shall present a single example.  
When people view their hand through optical prisms that shift the direction of 
light rays by a constant angle, they experience a conflict between the seen and the felt 
position of their hand. After a certain time of adaptation, people no longer make two 
distinct judgments on the position of their hand, respectively grounded in vision and 
in proprioception. Rather, they report seeing and feeling their hand somewhere 
between the two positions where the hand is perceived on the basis of vision only and 
proprioception only. Furthermore, the hand is usually localized closer to the visually 
perceived position than to the proprioceptively perceived position (Welch and Warren 
1986). Prisms highlight the integration of the two information channels because there 
is an artificial conflict. But many bodily judgments in everyday life result from 
multimodal integration. The boundary between body senses and external senses is 
permeable. It may be hard to quantify the extent of multimodality, but recent evidence 
shows that what you can see when you are four-year old influences how you feel 
touch twenty years later, even if you are now blind (Röder et al. 2004). Furthermore, 
even in the absence of online visual inputs, visual imagery, whether as visual memory 
To appear in Metaphilosophy 
	   21	  
or visual prediction, can still impact your proprioceptive experiences (Smeets et al. 
2006). As Bermudez (1998, 141) noted, “it is in fact very rare that we have modality-
specific perceptions”, and the perception of one's body is no exception.  
The major influence of vision on bodily experiences is not accidental. It has a 
strong adaptative value. On the one hand, most of the time vision is more reliable than 
proprioception at determining spatial information. Combining visual information to 
proprioceptive information thus increases the accuracy of bodily self-knowledge. On 
the other hand, our body navigates in and interacts with the external world, which is 
given to us mainly through vision. In order to grasp the glass in front of me, I need to 
locate my hand relative to the glass in the environment where there can be obstacles 
to avoid. The body is embedded in its environment, and the perception of the body 
from the inside needs to be remapped within the external frame of reference provided 
by vision to interact with the environment.  
What are the epistemological implications of multimodality for bodily immunity? 
In other words, are bodily self-ascriptions based on multimodal grounds IEM? As I 
shall argue, the involvement of vision does not necessarily 'contaminate' bodily self-
ascriptions, and thus for two reasons. First, contrary to what is generally assumed, 
vision can sometimes guarantee bodily immunity. Second, even if vision does not 
guarantee bodily immunity, the integration between vision and proprioception does 
not involve an identification component, and thus lead to judgments that are IEM.  
Most examples in the literature appeal to indirect vision of one's body in mirrors 
to disqualify vision. For example, Ernst Mach famously reported that one day, he 
stepped in a bus and noticed a man that looks like a shabby pedagogue, while he was 
actually seeing himself in a large mirror at the far end of the bus. But there are some 
circumstances when one directly sees one's body and one cannot doubt that this is 
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one's own body that one sees.iv Whether vision guarantees bodily immunity or not 
depends on the visuo-spatial perspective (i.e. angle and distance at which the body is 
seen). If you see a body far away in the middle of a forest, it is highly unlikely that 
this body is your own. But if you see a nose by closing one eye and looking down at a 
very close distance, it cannot be anybody else's nose than your own. This is due to the 
fact that the representation of the body from this specific visuo-spatial perspective is 
self-specific. Put another way, it is anatomically impossible that it could be another 
individual's nose that you could see from this angle at this distance. Hence, one 
should not automatically disqualify vision as a valid ground for bodily immunity.  
Still, there are some cases - actually most cases - where vision does not guarantee 
bodily immunity. For instance, when I see my hand on the table, it could be as well 
another's hand. And if this visual information is integrated with proprioceptive 
information about the location of my hand, then my judgment "my hand is on the 
table" is based on mixed grounds, only partially IEM. If we defend the view that 
bodily self-ascriptions are IEM if and only if they are exclusively based on grounds 
that guarantee bodily immunity, then my judgment is not IEM. But there is no 
principle that commits us to defend this strong view of bodily immunity. Rather, we 
need to understand the basic mechanisms of multisensory integration if we want to 
assess the immunity of visuo-proprioceptive judgments. In particular, we need to 
determine if multimodal integration involves self-identification. Indeed, it is only if 
there is identification of the subject that there can be errors through misidentification 
relative to the subject.  
For two sensory signals to be integrated, they need to be assigned to the same 
individual (i.e. assumption of unity, cf. Welch and Warren 1986). What is thus 
required is to select the relevant sensory signals that come from a common source, 
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and to segregate them from those that come from a different source. In other words, it 
is not adaptative for the perceptual system to integrate proprioceptive information 
about one's hand with visual information about another's hand. Rather, it needs to 
make sure that both types of information are about the same hand in order to increase 
reliability of the perceptual judgment. The question then is whether the assumption of 
unity requires self-identification.  
On one interpretation, one would need first to identify whose hand one is seeing 
before integrating the visual information with the proprioceptive information. If so, 
visuo-proprioceptive integration would be identification-dependent. This 
interpretation, however, is misleading. Multimodal integration does not require that 
the subject feels that her hand is F, sees that x is F, judges that x is her hand, and 
integrates what she feels with what she sees. On the one hand, multimodal integration 
occurs very early on in the perceptual process, at a stage where raw modality-specific 
sensory signals are not available to the subject. Rather than identification, one may 
talk of a subpersonal process of assignment (Deneve and Pouget 2004). On the other 
hand, there is no need to first identify the source to determine that the sensory signals 
come from the same source. It suffices to compare the sensory signals themselves, 
and the information they carry. For example, if they occur at the same time and carry 
information about the same location within the same frame of reference, then it is 
likely that they carry information about the same individual. The reliability of the 
assumption of unity depends on the number of properties that are congruent across the 
sensory signals. Hence, the visual system does not have to identify the seen body as 
one's own body. Rather, the properties of the seen body are compared with the 
properties of the felt body (e.g. location, posture) and if they are similar enough, then 
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the visual and proprioceptive signals are melted into a multimodal perceptual 
experience of one's hand.  
Under normal circumstances, the process of assignemnt to a common source is 
reliable. The fact of the matter is that we do not integrate visual information from 
other people's bodies with proprioceptive information from our own body, except in 
some artificially induced bodily illusions. This does not mean, however, that the 
assignment process is infallible. It may happen that visual information about a rubber 
hand is integrated with proprioceptive information about one's hand because visual 
information is mistakenly assigned to the same hand as proprioceptive information. 
Consequently, there can be errors. But they are not errors through misidentification.  
To conclude, one should not accept the classical dichotomy between immunity-
preserving body senses and vulnerable vision. Nor should one assume the exclusive 
thesis such as only the judgments that are exclusively grounded in body senses are 
immune to error. Rather, I propose to extend the list of grounds appropriate for bodily 
IEM to include visual experiences of the body from a self-specific perspective and 
bodily experiences resulting from the integration of vision and body senses. Only 
sensory signals assigned to a common source are indeed integrated together, and the 
assignment to a common source results from a subpersonal comparative process that 
does not depend on self-identification. Consequently, bodily immunity is preserved in 
integration-based bodily self-ascriptions. It might happen that the assignment process 
fails, but this cannot be assimilated to an error through misidentification relative to 
the first-person.  
 
Conclusion 
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In this paper, I opened new avenues of dialogue between philosophers and scientists 
working on the body and the self. In particular, I discussed how recent empirical 
evidence, on topics such as the Rubber Hand Illusion, somatoparaphrenia and the 
multimodal nature of bodily self-knowledge, can help philosophers to revise and 
refine a classic view of ownership and immunity that puts bodily sensations at its 
core.  
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i Arguably, the specific type of spatial content that characterizes bodily experiences 
ultimately derives from the privileged informational/causal relation between the body 
senses and one's body.  
ii	  For a detailed account of the sense of ownership, see de Vignemont 2007; 2010b. 
For a detailed account of bodily immunity, see de Vignemont forthcoming.	  
iii Furthermore, one may suggest that the urge to touch their body found in some 
patients reveals that tactile experiences ground the sense of ownership and through 
feeling touch, they can recover the experience of their body as their own. 
iv In addition, some visual experiences of the external world can guarantee bodily 
immunity. See Evans 1982, Bermudez 1998 and de Vignemont 2011a for more 
details.  
